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CRIMINAL LAw-A STUDY OF STATUTORY BLACKMAIL AND ExTORTION IN THE SEVERAL STATES-In attempting to define the crime

of extortion or blackmail, it must be pointed out at the outset that
there is a technical crime known as extortion, which stems from the
common law, and there is another statutory crime which may be called
extortion or blackmail, this latter crime being what the lawyer and laymen usually refer to by the term blackmail. Extortion at common law
was the unlawful taking by an officer, by color of his office, of any
money or thing of value that was not due him, or more than was due,
or before it was due.1 To state the case simply, if any tax official demanded taxes of a citizen before they were due, that official was guilty
of extortion. A private citizen could not be guilty of this crime. The
scope of that common law offense was enlarged by statute to include
any obtaining by any person of property of another with his consent
through a wrongful threat to do injury. And so by enlarging the scope
of the common law offense a new statutory offense was in fact created.
It is with this statutory offense, whether it is called extortion or blackmail, or even if it does not have a name, that this paper deals. There
are many variations in the statutes defining this broader statutory offense, which the author will hereinafter refer to as blackmail. If the

t Professor of law, University of Michigan Law School.-Ed.
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AM.

JuR., Extortions and Blackmail, § 2, 234 (1939).
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re~der were to pick a few states at random and look up the .law in
those states, he would probably find that no two of them are alike in
all their requirements. However, there are certain similarities in various
of the state statutes which fit into certain patterns; and upon taking an
overall view of all the statutes, modified categorizations may be set
forth. It is the purpose of the author to present this overall picture by
classifying and· comparing the express language of the statutes of all
the jurisdictions within the United States, interposing at times comments on the broad, and sometimes ambiguous language used by the
legislators. The crime of extortion by a public official is not within the
scope of this paper; neither are threats which are punishable even
though no property is demanded.
Before an ordinary citizen can be guilty of the crime of blackmail,
he must make a threat; either oral, or in writing, or in print. A statute
may provide that the threat may be made by any one or by all of these
methods. The e:ffectiveness of the threat may also be an element of
the crime; the statutes may provide for punishment of an unsuccessful
attempt to extort something of value, or they may punish the blackmailer only if he is successful in getting what he wants. It is in comparing these requisites of the statutes that numerous combinations result. They are: (a) successful or unsuccessful oral and written threats
with the same punishment for all; 2 (b) successful oral and written
threats with the same punishment for both, unsuccessful written threats
with the same punishment as successful threats, and unsuccessful oral
threats with a lesser punishment for that attempt; 8 (c) successful or
unsuccessful written threats for which a greater punishment is provided
than for successful or unsuccessful oral threats; 4 (d) only written
threats are punishable whether they are successful or unsuccessful; G
( e) only successful threats_ are punishable, whether they are oral or
written; 6 (f) successful oral or written threats are punished more
severely than unsuccessful oral or written threats.7 Some statutes pro·vide for the crime but do not specify whether the threat need be oral
or written; 8 it has been presumed in these instances for the purpose
of classification that the threat can be either oral or written.
Ala., Conn., D.C., Fla., Ga., Ind., Iowa, Kan., La., Me., Md., Mass., Mich.,
Neb., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.M., Ohio, Oregon, Pa., R.I., Tenn., Tex., Vt., Wash.
§ 2613, Wis., Wyo.
8
Cal., Idaho, Mo., Mont., N.Y., N.D., Okla., S.D., Utah.
4
Ky., Minn.
5
Ark., Colo., Del., Miss., N.C. (except threat to accuse of crime, which may be
oral).
6
Ariz., Va.
7
Wash.§§ 2610 and 2613; W. Va.
8
Ariz., La., Vt., Va., W. Va.
2
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In a large majority of the states the threat must be to do injury
to the person threatened; 9 in others, to do injury to the person threatened or to members of his family; 10 in others, to do injury to the person
threatened or to members of his family or his relatives,11 and a variation
of this, to do injury to the person threatened, his family or those related
by blood, marriage or adoption; 12 in only one, to do injury to the person threatened, his family or any other person held dear to him; 13
and only in a few states the threat may be to do injury to the person
threatened or to any other person. 1 ' Because of the ambiguous language
of the statutes in a few states,15 it is difficult to say whether the threat
must be to do injury to the person threatened or may be to do an
injury to the person threatened or to any other person. The Arkansas
statute is a good example of this ambiguity, for it reads: "If any person shall willfully and maliciously send, or deliver, or make, or for
the purpose of being delivered or sent shall part with the possession
of any letter or writing, with or without a name subscribed thereto, or
signed with a fictitious name, or with any letter, mark or designation,
threatening therein to accuse any person of a crime, or to do any injury
to the person or property of any one, with a view or intent to extort
or gain any money or property of any description belonging to another, he shall be deemed guilty of an attempt to rob ...•" 16
Threats to inflict personal injury and injury to property are punishable according to all the statutes except that of the District of Columbia.
The language of the statute of North Carolina is, "If any person shall
knowingly send or deliver any letter or writing demanding of any other
person, with menaces and without any reasonable or probable cause,
any chattel, money or valuable security; . . . every such offender
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." 17 This language, i.e., "demanding
... with menaces," probably includes threats to do injury to person
and property. In Ohio a threat of any kind to destroy property is
punishable by one to ten years' imprisonment,18 and in Pennsylvania
9

Ala. (except where personal injury to any member of his family is threatened),
Colo., Conn., D.C., Ga., Iowa, Me., Minn., N.H., N.M., N.C., Ohio, Pa. § 4803,
R. I., Tenn., Tex., Vt., Wash. (except personal injury may be threatened to any member of his family), Wis., Wyo.
10
Ind., Idaho, Mich., N.Y. (if successful), W.Va.
11
Ariz., N.D., Okla., Oregon, Pa. § 4806, S.D., Utah.
12 Ill.
1a La:
u Del., Fla., Mass., N.Y. (if unsuccessful), Pa. §§ 4804 and 4805.
15
Ark., Cal., Kan., Ky., Md., Miss., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.J.
16
Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 3038. (Italics are the author's.)
17
N. C. Gen. Stat. ( 1943) § 14-118.
18
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (1939) § 13387.
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a threat to destroy real or personal property is punishable by a fine
not to exceed seven thousand dollars or imprisonment not to exceed
fifteen years; 19 both are instances in which threats to injure property
may be punished more severely than threats to do other injury.
: All the statutes, except that of New Mexico, ~pecifically include
punishment of a threat to accuse of a crime. In Pennsylvania the terms
"any heinous crime" 20 are used. That the blackmailer actually was convinced in his own mind that the victim committed the crime has no
bearing on the good faith or intent of the blackmailer in any of the
states.21 In some states under no circumstances is it material to the
guilt or innocence of the blackmailer whether the person threatened
is or is not guilty of the crime of which he is accused. 22 To illustrate,
in New York, if B obtains money from A under a threat of criminal
prosecution against A for watering cotton which he sold to B, B is
guilty of blackmail whether A actually watered the cotton or not. Likewise, if B obtains money from A under a thteat to accuse A of stealing
property from X, B is guilty of blackmail whether or not A stole the
property. However, some states draw a distinction between the two
cases just cited.23 If B, believing that A knowingly poisoned B's cattle,
threatens to prosecute A criminally unless A deeds to B certain land
commensurate in value with the dead cattle, the Ohio courts will, upon
the trial of B for blackmail, admit evidence bearing upon whether or
not A poisoned B's cattle and therefore owes B money. The theory
behind the admission of this evidence is that an honest effort on the
part of a creditor to collect a just debt, by accusing· or threatening to
accuse the debtor of a crime with which the debt is connected, or out
of which it arose, does not come within the purview of the blackmail
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1939) tit. 18, § 4806.
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1939) tit. 18, § 4803.
21 Commonwealth v. Coolidge, 128 Mass. 55 (1880), is a case deciding this specific point and is of particular interest since Massachusetts is within the group of states
referred to in footnote 23, infra. Although practically all the statutes are silent concerning the general subject discussed in this portion of the comment, the author considered
the subject important enough to warrant a study of the case law; and the results of the
author's findings and general citations of cases are included herein.
22 Lee v. State, 16 Ariz. 291, 145 P. 244 (1914); People v. Choynski, 95 Cal.
640, 30 P. 791 (1892); State v. Debolt, 104 Iowa 105, 73 N. W. 499 (1897);
People v. Whittemore, 102 Mich. 519, 61 N. W. 13 (1894); People v. Wick~s, II2
App. Div. 39, 98 N. Y. S. 163 (1906); Bianchi v. Leon, 138 App. Div. 215, 122
N. Y. S. 1004 (1910); Commonwealth v. Bernstine, 103 Pa. Sup~r. 518, 157 A. 698
(1931); In re Sherin, 27 S.D. 232, 130 N. W. 761 (19u); State v. Needham, 20
Thomp. (147 Tenn.) 50, 245 S. W. 527 (1922)'.
23 Mann v. State, 47 Ohio St. 559, 26 N. E. 226 (1890); Elliott v. State, 36
Ohio 318 (1881); Cohen v. State, 37 Tex. Crim, Rep. 118, 38 S. W. 1005 (1897);
State v. Burns, 161 Wash. 362, 297 P. 212 (1931).
19

20
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statute. The Ohio court states the proposition thus: "The intent to
extort may indeed exist, notwithstanding the truth of the accusation,
and yet, in the light of surrounding circumstances, the fact that the
accusation is true may strongly aid in negativing such intent." 24 This
is what is meant when the courts in a few states say that the truth of
the accusation may be material for the defense in determining the intent or good faith with which the defendant made the accusation. On
the other hand, if B, believing that A has burned his own barn in order
to collect the insurance, threatens to accuse A of arson unless A pays B
a certain sum of money, in Ohio, the guilt or innocence of A is immaterial to the guilt or innocence of B. The Washington court goes
perhaps a step further in its conditions. In State v. Burns it said, "If A
steals money from B, B may demand its return, and, if restitution be
refused, B may threaten criminal prosecution, and, if he limits his
demand to the specific amount embezzled, do no violence to the penal
code. However, B may not demand of A more than is due him, and,
if B by threats and duress obtains more than rightly belongs to him,
he violates the statute. Nor may B, in his attempt to recover what is
due him, by means of threats accuse A of the commission of another
crime, or threaten to expose him to public ridicule. But so long as B
limits his demand to the return of the specific article stolen, or to the
exact amount of money embezzled, the statute is not violated." 25
Therefore, the Washington court concludes, the guilt or innocence of
the victim is material as bearing on the intent of the so-called blackmailer. The Maryland statute provides a lesser punishment for a false
accusation or threat to accuse of crime than for a true one.
Roughly half the states include the threat to expose or accuse of a
deformity, immoral conduct, etc., which would subject the victim to
disgrace or the ridicule of society.26 A somewhat smaller number punish
a threat to expose a secret. 21 And about one-fourth of the statutes provide punishment for a threat to publish or connive at publishing any
libel. 28 Threats to injure character,29 reputation,3° or business 81 are
punishable in a few states.
2

Mann v. State, 47 Ohio St. 556 at 565, 245 S. W. 527 (1922).
State v. Burns, 161 Wash. 362 at 367, 297 P. 212 (1931).
26
Ala., Ariz., Cal., D.C., Ga., Ill., Ind., Idaho, Kan., Ky., La., Md., Minn.,
Mont., Neb., Nev., N.Y., N.D., Ohio, Okla., S.D., Utah, Wash., Wyo.
27
Ala., Ariz., Cal., Idaho, La., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.Y., N.D., Okla., S.D., Utah,
Wash.
28
Ala., Cal., Ga., Idaho, Ky., Minn., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.Y., N.D., Utah, Wash.
29
Ala., La., Va., W.Va.
3
° Conn., Pa., Tenn. [absolutely not included in Wisconsin, see Judevine v.
Benzies-Montanye Fuel & Warehouse Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W. 295 (1936)].
31
Pa., Wis.
"

25
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In making the threat, the blackmailer may demand from the victim
any or several of a great number of things. If he demands money, that
is sufficient in all the states. In a large number of the statutes the word
"property" 82 is used, whereas in some "chattel" 38 is used. Other terms
used are "security," 34 "pecuniary benefit," 35 "pecuniary advantage," 86
"any benefit," 87 "any advantage whatever," 88 "anything of value," 89
"other valuable consideration." 40 And again the threat may be made
to induce th~ victim to do any act against his will; 41 to induce him to
do an illegal or wrongful act; 42 to induce him to subscribe, alter, execute or destroy a valuable instrument, security or writing affecting a
cause of action or defense or property.43 Or the threat may be made to
gain an acquittance 44 or immunity of any description; 45 to influence
actions of officials; 46 or to confer upon or procure for any person any
appointment or office of profit or trust.47 According to the Virginia
statute this benefit may come from the person threatened or from any
other person. In Nebraska this advantage may be for the benefit of the
person who makes the threat or for any other person.
Because the precise language of a statute should be studied to understand the law in a certain state, it is suggested that the Appendix
be used by the reader who is interested in investigating this subject
further. It will be noted that no sections appear in the Appendix for
the state of South Carolina; this is explained by the fact that the
author could find no statute on the subject in this state. As a matter
of fact, the sections included in many instances were either not indexed
or were indexed 'under such peculiar topics that they were difficult
82 Ala., Ariz., Ark., Cal., Del., Idaho, Ky., Minn., Miss., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.Y.,
N.D., Okla., Oregon, Pa., S.D., R.I., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Va., Wash.
88 Colo., Ga., Ill., Kan., Md., N.D., Ohio, Wyo.
H Ala., Del., Ind., Kan., Mo., N.C., Ohio, Pa., Va., W.Va., Wyo.
811 Iowa, Kan., Mass., Mich., N.H., R.I., Va., W.Va.
88 Ala., Conn., D.C., Fla., Mich., N.M., Ohio, Oregon, Tenn., Vt., Wis.
a1 Ala.
88 La., Me., Neb., Nev., Tex.
89 Colo., Del., D.C., ,Ga., Ill., La. (this means anything susceptible of ownership),
Md., Mo., N.J., Pa., Tex.
40 Idaho, Neb., N.D.
. u Ala., Conn., Fla., Ga., Ind., Iowa, Kan., La., Me., Mass., Mich., Neb., N.H.,
N.M., Ohio, Oregon, R.I., Tenn., Vt., Wash., Wis., Wyo.
42 Ala., Minn., Mont., N.Y., Pa., Wis.
48 Ala., Cal., Idaho, Nev., N.D., Okla., S.D., Utah.

44

La.

La.
Ala., Cal.
,1Mo.
45

46
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to find. The Appendix must als~ be used in connection with the footnotes, since the author thought that repetitious citations of the sections
of the statutes in the footnotes were unnecessary and that such a method
of presenting the statutes would have made cumbersome reading.
Alice Kramer Griep*
APPENDIX
Ala. Code Ann. (1940) tit. 14, §§ 49, 50.
Ariz. Code Ann. (1939,) § 43-1901.
Ark. Dig. Stat. (Pope, 1937) § 3038.
Cal. Penal Code Ann. (Deering, 1941) §§ 518-520, 522-524, 257.
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1935) ch. 48, §190.
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930) § 6069.
Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 5291.
D. C. Code (1940) § 22-2305.
Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 836.05.
Ga. Code Ann. (Park, 1936) §§ 26-1801, 26-1802.
Idaho Code Ann. (1932) §§ 17-1509, 17-38m-17-3807.
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1941) ch. 38, §§ 240, 241.
Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 10-3204.
Iowa Code (Reichmann, 1939) § 13164.
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1936) §§ 21-529, 21-530, 21-532,
21-2412.
Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944) §§ 435.270, 435.280, 435.290.
La. Code of Crim. Law and Proc. (Dart, 1943) arts. 740-66.
Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) ch. 129, § 22.
Md. Ann. Code (Flack, 1939) art. 27, §§ 584-586.
Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1932) ch. 265, § 25.
Mich. Stat. Ann. (Penal Code, 1937) ch. 286a, § 28.410; Mich.
Comp. Laws (Supp. 1940) § 17115!.213.
Minn. Stat. (1927) §§ rn377, rn381, rn382.
Miss. Code Ann. (1942) § 2365.
Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1939) §§ 4452, 4455.
Mont. Rev. Code (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §§ 1138911393, 11397.
,
Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) §§ 28-441, 28-444, 28-445.
Nev. Comp. Laws (Hillyer, 1929) §§ rn423, 10501.
N. H. Rev. Laws ( 1942) ch. 442, § 37.
N. J. Rev. Stat. (1937) §§ 2:127-3, 2:127-4.
N. M. Stat. Ann. (1941) § 41-4601.
N. Y. Penal Law (McKinney, 1944) art. 80, §§ 850-861, 1347.
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N. C. Gen. Stat. (1943) § 14-II8.
N. D. Rev. Code Ann. (1943).§§ 12-2812, -i2-3701-12-3707.
Ohio Gen. Code Ann (1939) §§ 13384, 13387.
·
Okla. Stat. Ann (1941) tit. 21, §§ 1481-1487. ·
Or~. Cqmp. Laws Ann. (1940) § 23-441.
Pa. Stat. Ann: (Purdon, 1939) tit. 18, §§ 48or-4806.
R. I. Gen. Laws (1938) ch. 606, § 17.
S. D. Code Ann. (1939) §§ r3.3901-13.3906.
Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 10806.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. (Vernon, 1925) arts. 1268, 1268a.
Utah Code Ann. (1943) §§ 103-17-1-ro3-17-8.
Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) § 8408.
Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942} tit. 40, § 4406.
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, Supp. 1940) §§ 26ro, 2613.
W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1943) § 5928.
Wis. Stat. (r943) § 340.45.
Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (r93r) § 32-226.

